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1 Introduction
Taxes on housing properties are often object of a heated political debate. In Italy,
at the closing of the electoral campaign for the 2006 parliamentary elections,
the candidate for Prime Minister of the right-wing coalition, Silvio Berlusconi,
announced that, in case of victory, his government would have abolished the
local tax (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili, ICI) on owner-occupied housing
properties.1
Thanks to this unexpected announcement, that bought the vote of many home-
owners for the right-wing candidate, the forecasted vote margin, in favor of the
left-wing candidate, Romano Prodi, throughout the electoral campaign, consider-
ably reduced. Nonetheless, the left-wing coalition won the elections, albeit for a
narrow margin. As a result, the government headed by Romano Prodi, supported
by a weak majority in the Parliament, had to resign in 2008 and immediately
afterward new general elections were held. This time, the coalition headed by
Silvio Berlusconi won the elections and formed a new government on May 8, 2008.
On May 27, the Prime Minister honored his 2006 electoral promise, by exempting
taxpayers from the payment of the local property tax levied on owner-occupied
dwellings.
From the perspective of Municipal public finances, the main feature of the 2008 lo-
cal fiscal reform is that it abolished the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings
– one of the main sources of revenues for Italian municipalities, bearing high polit-
ical costs as it directly links the local decision maker to her voters – by substitut-
ing it with a compensating transfer from the central government – that, contrary
to own tax revenues, bears no political costs for the local decision maker. The
impact on the incentives for municipal spending and taxes of this sharp change in
the structure of municipal revenues is the primary focus of this work, with par-
ticular reference to the strategic incentives to manipulate policy decisions close
to elections, as evidenced by the well-known literature on political budget cycles.
The classical theoretical framework on political budget cycles is due to Rogo↵
1According to Corriere della Sera – one of the most leading Italian newspaper – the property
tax is considered as the most “hated” tax by Italian taxpayers (Corriere della Sera, May 22,
2007).
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and Sibert (1988) and Rogo↵ (1990) who show that, when voters are rational
but imperfectly informed about the complexities of the government budget, the
incumbent leader has an incentive to bias the pre-election fiscal policy. In these
papers, it is assumed that each political candidate has a competence level (high
or low), which is only known to the politician and not to the electorate. Before
the election, the high-type incumbent will signal his type (and thereby increase
his chances of reelection) by engaging in expansionary fiscal policy (Rogo↵ and
Sibert,1988), or in a switch from investment expenditure to a more visible con-
sumption spending (Rogo↵,1990). Both actions are less “costly” for the high type
incumbent than for the low type, leading to a budget cycle (pre-election increase
in government deficit) when a competent politician is in o ce. Since then, a
large literature has developed, documenting and seeking to explain whether the
electoral budget cycles exist. However most studies are based on cross-country
samples of central government budgets.2 In fact, few works focus on the local
government level, because data at the local level are available for shorter time
periods than national data, or because all local elections occur at the same time,
which does not allow to identify the election year e↵ect for a specific govern-
ment layer (Sjahrir et al., 2013). Evidence of local political budget cycles is
found by Kneebon and McKenzie (2001), who use data on Canadian provinces
over the period 1966-1997, finding that more visible expenditure - as Education,
Transportation and Communication, and Recreation and Culture - increases in
election years versus non-election years. The same findings are found by Drazen
and Eslava (2010), who, relying on data on Colombian municipalities, show that,
prior to elections, infrastructure spending - that is considered more attractive
to voters - expands significantly. Akhmedov and Zhuravska (2004), by using a
2Among others, Alesina et al. (1997), by using a sample of 13 OECD countries for the period
1960-1993, find the presence of the political budget cycle only in the aggregate balance, while,
when they split the budget into di↵erent components, they do not find any significant results.
Persson and Tabellini (2000) investigate whether the budget cycles are driven by the system
of government, finding the cycle only for revenue and only in the presidential systems. Other
works have shown that budget cycles occur only in certain countries. In particular, Shi and
Svensson (2006), using a panel of 123 countries over the period 1975-1995, show that budget
cycles exist only in developing countries and Brender and Drazen (2008), using a sample of 106
countries in the years 1960-2001, find the presence of the political budget cycles only in new
democracies.
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Russian provinces monthly panel data in the period 1998-2003, find significant
political cycles in budget spending and its composition. Khemani (2004) consid-
ers 14 major states of India over the period 1960-1992 and shows that in election
years tax collection from specific producer groups is lower and public investment
spending is higher. Finally, a quasi-experimental strategy has been recently ex-
ploited by Alesina and Paradisi (2014) in order to test the budget cycle. They use
a cross-section of Italian municipalities for the year 2012, at the end of which all
municipalities were imposed to deliberate on the new real estate tax rate (IMU)
- both on owner-occupied dwellings and other dwellings - , testing the impact on
the tax rate deliberation for those municipalities having elections scheduled in
2013. They find evidence of the political budget cycle, in fact municipalities with
elections scheduled in 2013 set lower tax rates for owner-occupied dwellings than
those not having elections. Interestingly, they do not find any significant e↵ect
for tax rates on other dwellings. However, when they replicate the analysis for
tax rates set in 2013, when only the tax on other dwellings was in place, they
find that municipalities having elections scheduled in 2014 set significantly lower
tax rates than those not having elections.
In our work we rely on a panel data of Italian municipalities and we exploit
the exogenous change in their financial system – replacement of the property
tax on owner-occupied dwellings with a compensating vertical transfer – to iden-
tify whether this policy shift a↵ected the incentives for strategic manipulation of
taxes and spending decisions of municipalities close to elections. Hence, interest-
ingly, our setting can let us understand whether the reform triggers the policy
maker behavior, typical of the political budget cycle. To identify the e↵ect of
the reform, we exploit the staggered structure of the electoral years of Italian
municipal elections. In particular, we divide the municipalities, observed in a
specific time period (2002-2008), into two groups: (i) those that in that period
held one election before the reform and one election after the reform, implying
that one pre-electoral year falls before the reform and one after the reform, and
(ii) municipalities that held one or two elections, both before the reform, implying
that all pre-electoral years fall before the reform. We then compare decisions on
expenditure and revenue for the two groups of municipalities during their pre-
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electoral years. While, before the reform, the policy outcome decisions in the
pre-electoral year should be similar for both groups of municipalities – as the
financing system is the same for both groups, after the reform the change in the
municipal financing system may show up in di↵erent policy outcome decisions
for the two groups. In particular, we expect that the incentive to strategically
manipulate decisions on expenditure and taxes should be more pronounced for
those municipalities that are in the pre-electoral year after the reform, as the
compensating transfer granted by the central government in replacement of the
revenue from the abolished property tax on owner-occupied dwellings bears no
political costs for the local decision maker. In fact, our results show that munici-
palities in the pre-electoral year after the reform increase expenditure by 3% with
respect to the average value of the municipal expenditure. Moreover, we find that
municipalities in the pre-electoral year after the reform increase revenue from fees
and charges by 10% with respect to the average value, suggesting that the reform
prompted incentives to strategically manipulate policy outcome decisions when
municipalities are close to elections (political budget cycle), resulting not only in
an increase in expenditure, but also in the recourse to a less transparent revenue
source such as charges and fees (Bracco et al., 2013).
The rest of the work is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the fiscal policy
reform and provides some institutional information on the finance of Italian mu-
nicipalities. The identification strategy is illustrated in Section 3. The dataset
and some preliminary evidence are presented in Section 4. Our empirical analysis,
the results and the robustness checks are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional framework
Municipalities in Italy are responsible for a large array of important public pro-
grams in the field of welfare services, territorial development, local transport,
infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police services, as
well as infrastructural spending. As regards their share of the general govern-
ment budget, municipalities account on average for about 8% of total public
expenditure during the period 2002-2008, which is the time span we use in the
empirical analysis.
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On the revenue side, municipalities can rely on transfers from upper levels of gov-
ernment (mainly central and regional governments) and, as a result of a lengthy
process of fiscal devolution, they rely on own taxes.
The main local tax revenue is given by the property tax, ICI (Imposta comunale
sugli immobili, now renamed IMU ), introduced in 1992 and applied to real estate.
This tax is paid every year by property owners directly to the municipality where
the property is located. In particular, the ICI tax base is the cadastral income,
which does not vary over time (occasionally, cadastral values are increased by the
same proportion, so they do not change in relative terms), and the tax is levied
di↵erently on owner-occupied dwellings (the dwellings where owners have their
residence) and on other dwellings (rented properties, secondary properties used
for holidays, and so on): tax rates are lower on the former, and tax credits are
allowed only for the former.
Other important tax revenue sources for municipalities are the tax or tari↵ on
urban waste disposal (Tarsu, now renamed TARI ), and a surtax on personal
central income tax (Addizionale comunale Irpef ). Additional own revenues can
be raised by Italian municipalities through user fees, which are linked to the
municipal provision of various services for parking permits, occupation of public
spaces and areas and, use of billboards.
The Decree no. 93 of 27 May 2008 abolished the property tax levied on owner-
occupied dwellings. For public finances of municipalities the resulting loss of tax
yield was partially compensated by a transfer from the central government, thus
changing the structure of local finance towards a more centralized system. Hence,
from 2008 each municipality received a transfer whose amount was determined
by the amount of lost tax yield, but corrected according to two criteria: a) e -
ciency in tax collection, measured by the ratio between the average value of the
revenue of the property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings for the period
2004-2006, measured in cash terms, and the corresponding value measured in ac-
crual terms; b) compliance with the fiscal rules imposed by the central government
to each municipality (domestic stability pact) for the year 2007. Furthermore,
6
special provisions applied to municipalities with a population lower than 5,000
inhabitants. Overall, the aggregate amount of compensating transfer received by
Italian municipalities in 2008 was about 2.8 billion euro, while the revenue from
the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings collected in 2007 was around 3.5
billion euro.
Clearly the fulfillment of these criteria in determining the amount of compen-
sating transfers, introduced in 2008, is based on decisions taken beforehand, and
thus could not be a↵ected by policy maker decisions taken in 2008. Hence, the
received per capita transfer was, for the local policy maker, truly exogenous.
2.1 The Italian institutional thresholds
There are two dimensions that need to be carefully considered in order to assess
our empirical analysis.
The first one relates to the choice of the time span, since the abolition of the
property tax on owner-occupied dwellings is not the only institutional policy
reform that took place in Italy during the last 15 years. For Regions ruled by
ordinary statutes, starting from 2002, municipalities have been granted access
to a fixed share of the personal income tax revenues generated in their territory
(with a corresponding reduction in central transfers). Furthermore, in May 2009
was approved an important law (Law 42/2009) which opened the way to the
introduction of “fiscal federalism”in Italy. Hence, from 2009 onwards, as a result
of the fiscal federalism process, the local fiscal rules have been frequently changing
from one year to another, including a set of local devolved small tax - such as
cadastral taxes on property sales and a fixed municipal share to the VAT (only for
2011) - , modifications of the equalization system and of the structure of vertical
transfers from the central government, the introduction in 2012 of a reformed
property tax on principal dwelling (Imposta Municipale Unica, IMU), with a tax
base slightly di↵erent from that of ICI and with part of the revenue retained by
the central government.
The second dimension regards the cross-section features of the dataset. In par-
ticular, the presence of di↵erent policy provisions at the municipal level based on
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population brackets (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013). The compensation of the
mayor, of the members of the executive committee and of the councilors, the size
of the council, the size of the executive committee, the electoral rule, whether or
not a municipality can have additional elective bodies in every neighborhood and
whether or not a municipality can host hospital facilities or organize a health-care
district, are all policies varying with population size. Moreover, vertical transfers
from the central government changes proportionally with the population (Law
504/1992). Finally, municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants are exempted from a
set of rules imposed by the national government to the municipalities in order
to improve their fiscal discipline (Domestic Stability Pact). All these policies,
based on population brackets, clearly a↵ect fiscal policy decisions at the local
level. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) find that better-paid politicians lower
per capita tari↵s and reduce both current and investment expenditure; Grembi
et al. (2016) find evidence that municipalities not constrained by the rules of the
Domestic Stability Pact have lower tax revenues and larger fiscal gaps compared
to constrained ones. There are also some recent works on the e↵ect of the Ital-
ian municipal electoral system on fiscal policy decisions. Bracco and Brugnoli
(2012) find that municipalities with runo↵ electoral systems that are politically
aligned with the central government receive, ceteris paribus, more transfers than
those that not aligned; Bordignon et el. (2013) find that municipalities just above
15,000 inhabitants (that rely on runo↵ elections) on average have a larger number
of candidates and less volatile tax rates, compared to municipalities just below
15,000 inhabitants (that have single round elections). Ferraresi et al. (2015) show
that taxes and expenditure in municipalities where the runo↵ electoral system
holds are lower than those in municipalities with a single round elections, but
only if the mayor of the former type of municipalities does not need a broad
coalition to be elected. These di↵erent policies based on population brackets
might a↵ect the identification of the impact of the property tax reform on fiscal
policy decisions.
Furthermore, regions with special autonomy are allowed to set their own fiscal
rules for municipal governments.
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3 Identification strategy
As we discussed in the previous section, there are several policies that change
at di↵erent population threshold, as well as other local structural reforms took
place in Italy in the last 15 years. The presence of these policies might confound
the impact on local policy choices of the replacement of the property tax on
owner-occupied dwellings with a vertical transfer, so that the e↵ect of the e↵ect
of reform cannot be properly identified. Hence, first, we restricted our sample to
municipalities belonging to regions ruled by ordinary status with a population
range between 3.000 and 5.000 inhabitants. Such restriction assures that no other
policies changes according to population size. Then, we focused on the period
2002-2008 because within this period we do not assist to any other local structural
reforms a part that of abolishing the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings.
We aim at estimating the causal e↵ect of upcoming elections on policy outcome
decisions of municipalities, by exploiting the following experiment. Imagine that
we can observe over a given period, including two pre-electoral years, two mu-
nicipalities, A and B, that are similar in the demographic, geographic and socio-
economic characteristics. Now, suppose to flip a coin to decide the timing of
elections and, say, that municipality A holds the election one year after the re-
form. The key point is that being in an electoral year is as good as randomly
assigned, so that the random assignment of the timing of elections generates a
random assignment in which municipality the election will be hold the year af-
ter the reform. Such exogenous variations, in terms of the timing of elections,
allows us to define a treated and a control group. In particular, municipality A,
which holds one election before the reform and one election the year after the
reform - implying that one pre-electoral year falls before the reform and the other
pre-electoral year falls after the reform - is our treated municipality; while mu-
nicipality B, which holds both elections before the reform - implying that both
pre-electoral years fall before the reform - is the control municipality. In this
way we can compare the policy outcome, in terms of revenue and expenditure
decisions, of municipality A (treated) with the policy outcome of municipality B
(control) before the reform, namely in a period where both municipalities have
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the same incentives to manipulate the budget in their pre-electoral years, since
they rely on the same set of tax instruments. Then, we compare the policy
outcome of municipality A with the policy outcome of municipality B after the
reform, namely in a period where the pre-electoral strategic choice of policy out-
come variables generated by the reform matters only for municipality A, since
municipality B has already held the election before the reform.
In the absence of the reform, the di↵erence in the policy outcomes in the pre-
electoral years between municipality A and municipality B before 2008, would be
exactly the same as the di↵erence in the policy outcomes in the pre-electoral year
between municipality A and municipality B after 2008. On the other hand, if the
abolition of the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings, with the replacement
of the lost revenue through a compensating transfer, changes the pre-electoral
strategic choice of policy outcome, we should observe a di↵erence in local tax
and spending decisions between municipality A and B after the reform: such
di↵erence would represent a causal e↵ect of the reform on the political budget
cycles, which in turn a↵ects policy outcome decisions.
4 Dataset and variables
4.1 Dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of Italian municipalities resulting
from a combination of di↵erent archives publicly available from the Italian Min-
istry of the Interior, the Italian Ministry of the Economy and the Italian Statis-
tical O ce. It includes a full range of information for each Italian municipality
organized into three sections: 1) financial data; 2) electoral data, covering the
results of elections in which the mayors in o ce during the period covered by the
dataset were elected; 3) demographic and socio-economic data, such as population
size, age structure, average income of inhabitants. In order to avoid overlapping
policies, as discussed in section 2.1, we restrict the sample to municipalities be-
longing to Regions ruled by ordinary status, for the period 2002-2008, with a
range of population between 3.000 and 5.000 inhabitants according to 2001 Cen-
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sus population. Also we did not include municipalities with missing values from
our dataset and municipality put under commissioner or municipality where the
majors resigned before the term. Finally we obtain a sample of 733 municipalities
including 5,131 observations from 2002 to 2008.3
4.2 Dependent variables
As our dependent variables on the expenditure side, we use the per capita current
expenditure (current expenditure). On the revenue side, we use the per capita
tax instruments that can be set by the local policy maker, like the property tax
on other dwellings (property tax on other dwellings), the surtax on the personal
income tax (surtax on personal income), and users’ fees and charges (fees and
charges). The reason for using per capita revenues (and not tax rates) is threefold.
First, a tax revenue financial variable is coherent and comparable with spending.
Second, it would be very di cult to have homogeneous comparable rates for all
kind of revenues we consider (taxes and fees and charges). Third, revenue gives
account for both tax rate e↵ort and e↵ort in tax evasion control, which are both
complementary important components of the municipality’s fiscal policy.
As a preliminary piece of evidence it is interesting to look at the mean di↵erence
in expenditure and revenue variables before and after the reform (Table 1). In
particular, the average current expenditure after the reform is 83.05 euro higher
than that before the reform and this di↵erence is statistically significant at 1%.
The same di↵erence for both revenue from property tax on other dwellings and
from surtax on personal income is, respectively, of 27.52 (1% significant) and
23.13 euro (1% significant). Note that revenues from fees and charges after the
reform do not di↵er from those of before the reform. What this simply suggests is
that the reform seems to have led to a significant increase in current expenditure,
3Over 8,442 (1,206 municipalities for 7 years) potential observations in the range between
3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, our sample includes 5,131 observations. As a matter of fact,
we exclude 1,456 (208 municipalities for 7 years) observations referring to municipalities in
Special Statute Regions and Province, 1,125 observations relative to municipalities put under
commissioner and municipality where the majors resigned before the term in the considered
period, and 730 observations relative to municipalities/years where data are not complete or
data are missing.
net of the increase in own revenues.
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Table 1: Mean di↵erence in expenditure and revenue before-after the reform
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Table 1: Mean difference in expenditur a d revenue befo e-after the reform. 
Outcome variables Before the reform After the reform Difference in means 
(1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1) 
current expenditure 620.21 703.25 83.05*** 
(3.21) (8.94) (6.64) 
property tax on other dwellings 140.56 168.08 27.52*** 
(3.15) (3.70) (4.07) 
surtax on personal income 26.23 49.36 23.13*** 
(0.37) (1.26) (0.80) 
fees and charges 176.59 177.95 1.35 
(2.72) (7.50) (7.34) 
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Years before the reform are 2002-2007. Year after the reform is 2008. Municipalities 
with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. For the variable property tax on other dwellings data are 
available only from the 2006 since the distinction between revenue from property tax levied on owner-occupied 
dwellings and revenue from property tax levied on other dwellings has been recorded in Italian municipal budget 
only from 2006 onwards. 
Table 2: Timing and frequencies of elections
REFORM
Type of municipality 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
control E (58)
IV
(58)
III 
(58)
II 
(58)
I 
(58)
E 
(58)
IV
(58)
III 
(58)
control I (25)
E 
(25)
IV
(25)
III 
(25)
II 
(25)
I 
(25)
E 
(25)
IV
(25)
treated II (506)
I 
(506)
E 
(506)
IV
(506)
III 
(506)
II 
(506)
I 
(506)
E 
(506)
control III (32)
II 
(32)
I 
(32)
E 
(32)
IV
(32)
III 
(32)
II 
(32)
I 
(32)
control IV(112)
III 
(112)
II 
(112)
I 
(112)
E 
(112)
IV
(112)
III 
(112)
II 
(112)
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Roman letters represent the years to the
following election, that is E = election, I = one year to the following election, II = two years to the following election, III = three years to the 
following election and IV = four years to the following elections. The number of municipalities is shown in parenthesis.
4.3 Treated and control municipalities
Since 1993, the Italian municipal electoral rule prescribes that elections are held
normally every 5 years during the period April-June. However, since the electoral
terms are not perfectly aligned, the timing of elections generates a random assign-
ment of municipalities, in the period 2002-2008, into two groups: those with an
election held after the reform and those with all elections held before the reform.
This exogenous assignment can be used to define a treated and a control group
for the 773 municipalities included in our dataset. Table 2 shows the timing and
the frequency of elections. In particular there are 506 municipalities (69% of the
total) tha held elections in 2004, and given that lections are running ev r 5
years, these municipalities are also the same that have elections scheduled for
2009.4 These municipalities represent our treated group since, given the timing
4We checked whether these 506 municipalities had the election in 2009 and actually all of
them had the election in 2009.
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of the elections, one pre-electoral year (2003) falls before the reform, while the
other pre-electoral year (2008) falls in the year of the reform (Decree no. 93 of
27 May 2008), which was also the same of the first switch from its own tax on
owner-occupied dwellings to a compensating transfer5. On the other hand, for
the remaining municipalities (227; 31% of the total) the pre-electoral year always
falls in a period before the reform, hence these municipalities are the control
group.
It is important to note that we do not consider in our dataset municipalities
that have not held elections every 5 years;6 that is, we excluded from the dataset
municipalities that had elections scheduled after 2009, but anticipated them in
2009: if these municipalities were included, the treatment would not be exogenous
to potential outcomes (Alesina and Paradisi, 2014)7.
Table 2: Timing and frequencies of elections
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Outcome variables Before the reform After the reform Difference in means
(1) (2) (3) = (2)-(1)
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only from 2006 onwards.
Table 2: Timing and frequencies of elections
REFORM 
Type of municipality 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
control E  (58) 
IV  
(58) 
III  
(58) 
II  
(58) 
I  
(58) 
E  
(58) 
IV  
(58) 
III  
(58) 
control I  (25) 
E  
(25) 
IV  
(25) 
III  
(25) 
II  
(25) 
I  
(25) 
E  
(25) 
IV  
(25) 
treated II  (506) 
I  
(506) 
E  
(506) 
IV  
(506) 
III  
(506) 
II  
(506) 
I  
(506) 
E  
(506) 
control III  (32) 
II  
(32) 
I  
(32) 
E  
(32) 
IV  
(32) 
III  
(32) 
II  
(32) 
I  
(32) 
control IV  (112) 
III  
(112) 
II  
(112) 
I  
(112) 
E  
(112) 
IV  
(112) 
III  
(112) 
II  
(112) 
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between  3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Roman  letters represent the years to the 
following election, that is E = election, I = one year to the following election, II = two years to the following election, III = three years to the 
following election and IV = four years to the following elections. The number of municipalities is shown in parenthesis.  
5Details on the timing of the transfers in 2008 can be found at
http://finanzalocale.interno.it/docum/studi/varie/soppressione ici.html
6Once we have excluded municipalities put under commissioner and municipalities where
data are noy complete or data are missing, our dataset contains information on 758 municipal-
ities observed for the period 2002-2008. However, we also exluded 25 municipalities which have
not held elections every 5 years and, among these, three municipalities had elections scheduled
after 2009, but anticipated them in 2009 because the mayor resigned before the term. Therefore,
the final sample includes 733 municipalities that held elections every 5 years.
7The same reason is pointed out by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) who argue that
moving elections away from the originally scheduled date creates concerns about identification.
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4.4 Socio-economic and demographic controls
We include a set of time-varying variables which characterize a municipality’s
demographic and economic situation. In relation to demographic control we
include the population of the municipality (pop), the population density (density)
calculated as the number of citizens per municipal area (measured in square
kilometers): these variables can capture the presence of scale economies in the
provision of public goods. The proportion of citizens aged between 0 and 5 (child)
and the proportion aged over 65 (aged) can account for some specific public needs
(e.g., nursery school, nursing homes for the elderly).
Regarding economic and financial controls we include the average per capita in-
come of municipalities, proxied by the personal income tax base (income) and
the per capita value of the transfers from the upper level of government (trans-
fers). Finally, we also set a dummy (election) equal to one for each election year
during the period 2002-2008, allowing to capture the e↵ect of having an election
during the considered period. The summary statistics, data description and data
sources of all the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix, Tables
A1 and A2.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Econometric specification
Formally, our estimation approach is based on a di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DiD)
framework and the baseline specification can be expressed as following:
Yit =  1pre electoral yearit +  2pre electoral yearit ⇥ after reform
+  0Xit + ↵i + ⌧t +  Trendit + ✏it
(1)
where Yit is one of the public policy outcomes we consider (i.e., per capita current
expenditure, per capita revenue of property tax on other dwellings, per capita
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revenue of surtax on personal income and per capita revenue of fees and charges)
for municipality i at time t ; pre electoral year is a dummy variable equals 1 in the
year before the election and 0 otherwise, after reform is a dummy variable equal
to 1 in the year 2008, when the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings has
been abolished and replaced by a compensating vertical transfer; Xit contains all
the control variables discussed in section 4.4. To take account of unobserved het-
erogeneities across municipalities, we include a set of municipalities fixed e↵ects,
↵i, and we also control for exogenous shocks that can equally a↵ect both treated
and control group by adding year fixed e↵ects, ⌧t. Moreover, Trendit, reflects a
complete set of municipality-specific time trends. A key identifying assumption
of the DiD approach is that the temporal development of each municipality would
have been the same in the absence of any treatment. Hence, by including the set
of municipality specific time trend we control for any potential temporal pattern
independent of the treatment status. Finally, "it is the error term, clustered at
the municipal level.
In this framework,  1, accounts for the impact of upcoming elections on the
policy outcome before the reform, while  2 is the DiD estimator, which captures
the di↵erential e↵ect – on the policy outcome – with respect to  1 of being in a
pre-electoral year after the reform.
5.2 Results
For each outcome variables, we present our DiD estimates as in equation (1). As
for the expenditure side of the budget, we find that the coe cient estimate of pre
electoral year ⇥after reform is positive and statistically significant at 5% level
(col. 1; Table 3). In terms of the size of the estimated e↵ect, the results suggest
that the current expenditure of municipalities in the pre-electoral year after the
reform is 19.04 euro higher, ceteris paribus, compared to what it would have been
in the absence of the reform, and this amount corresponds to 3% increase with
respect to the average value of expenditure (632.07 per capita euro).
Looking at the revenue side of the budget, we find that the coe cient of pre
electoral year ⇥after reform is not statistically di↵erent from zero neither for the
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revenue from property tax on other dwellings, nor for the revenue from the surtax
on personal income (col. 2 and 3; table 3); while it is positive and statistically
significant at 5% level for the revenue from fees and charges (col. 4; table 3).
In particular, we find evidence that the revenue from fees and charges of mu-
nicipalities in the pre-electoral year after the reform is 17.75 euro higher, ceteris
paribus, compared to what it would have been in the absence of the reform, which
corresponds to an approximately 10% increase with respect to the average value
of the revenue from fees and charges (176.69).
What this suggests is that substituting own municipal revenue with compensat-
ing transfers from the central government generates incentives for municipalities
to increase both expenditure and revenue from charges and fees the year before
elections, and so accounting for the presence of the political budget cycles. The
intuition of these results is simple. On the one hand, the political cost of in-
creasing expenditure, after the reform, is lower, given that at least part of the
increase in local expenditure is financed by the compensating transfer (which
has no political cost for the local decision maker) replacing the property tax on
owner-occupied dwellings, which was political costly because easily related to the
local decision maker (Dahlby, 2011). On the other hand, the abolition of a visible
fiscal tool, as it was the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings, leads local
governments to substitute it with the less visible available revenue source (fees
and charges) the year before the election. Fees and charges are, indeed, much
less visible to voters with respect to other left tax instruments, because they are
collected several times during the fiscal year and their amount is, generally, rela-
tively small, so voters do not easily understand how much power a mayor has in
setting these fees (Bracco et al., 2013).
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Table 3: Policy outcomes baseline results
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Table 3: Policy outcomes baseline results
current expenditure 
property tax on 
other dwellings 
surtax on personal 
income 
fees and 
charges 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
pre electoral year -0.42 13.28 0.97 -3.04 
(3.03) (12.76) (0.86) (2.61) 
pre electoral year × after reform 19.04** -21.34 1.05 17.75** 
(7.65) (17.80) (2.36) (7.54) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipal time trend YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,131 2,199 5,131 5,131 
Number of municipalities 733 733 733 733 
Treated municipalities 506 506 506 506 
Control municipalities 227 227 227 227 
R-squared within 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.56 
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable 
equals to one in the year before the election and after reform is a dummy variable equals to one after the reform (2008). The number of 
observations in col. (2) is 2,199 since the distinction between revenue from property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings and revenue 
from property tax levied on other dwellings has been recorded in Italian municipal budget only from 2006 onwards. In all regression we 
control for population, density, child, aged, transfers, income, election, municipal effects, municipal time trend and year effects. Robust 
standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Table 4: Policy outcomes results on a sample of matched municipalities
current
expenditure 
property tax on
other dwellings
surtax on personal
income
fees and
charges
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
pre electoral year -0.00 14.06 1.01 -3.78
(3.48) (16.43) (1.04) (3.11)
pre electoral year × after Reform 21.91** -21.51 -1.55 19.82**
(8.67) (21.37) (2.72) (8.08)
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Municipal time trend YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,669 2,001 4,669 4,669
Number of municipalities 667 667 667 667
Treated municipalities 502 502 502 502
Control municipalities 165 165 165 165
R-squared within 0.65 0.62 0.49 0.56
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable
equals to one in the year before the election and after reform is a dummy variable equals to one after the reform (2008). The number of
observations in col. (2) is 2,001 since the distinction between revenue from property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings and revenue
from property tax levied on other dwellings has been recorded in Italian municipal budget only from 2006 onwards. In all regression we
5.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we assess the validity of the previous results by performing a set
of robustness tests.
Even though we have restricted our analysis to municipalities belonging to the
range of 3,000 - 5,000 inhabitants to avoid the presence of other overlapping poli-
cies, one source of potential concerns is that the group of treated municipalities
might di↵er in some characteristics with respect to the control group of munici-
palities, making thus our “random assignment” hypoth sis of the treated status
weaker. Therefore, we address this issu by using the matching approach8, that
consists to match treated and control group based on a set of observable char-
8The  matching  approach  has  been performed by using the Stata command  psmatch2 devel-
oped by Leuven and Sianesi (2010). Moreover, we have performed the matching procedure by
using the observations lying on the common support, resulting in 4 municipalities outside the
common support.
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acteristics. In particular, to match treated and control group, we use data from
2001 Census and we ran a logit regression (details are available in the Appendix,
Table A3) by using, as control variables, those variables that might a↵ect both
the treatment and outcome variable (Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005), which
are: population (population), a categorical variable (altimetry zone) equal to 1 if
the municipality is located in plain, equal to 2 if the municipality is located in hill,
and equal to 3 if the municipality is located in mountain, the proportion of pop-
ulation over 65 years old (aged), the proportion of population less than 5 years
old (child), the population density (density), the per capita income (income),
the per capita grants from upper level of government (transfers), the proportion
of families (families), the per capita number of houses (houses), the per capita
number of firms (firms), the unemployed rate (unemployed) and the average al-
titude level of the municipal territory (altitude). Then we match the sample of
treated to a comparable sample of non treated, linking each municipality only
to its “nearest neighbor” in terms of municipalities propensity score. Such pro-
cedure reduces the sample to 667 municipalities and, within this sample, there
are no significant di↵erences, on the observable characteristics included, between
the matched group of treated and control municipalities (details are available in
the Appendix, Table A4). In addition, the distributions of the estimated propen-
sity score for the treated group and the control group show overlapping (Figure
1), implying that for each treated municipality there is a control with similar
characteristics, so it is possible to obtain a valid inference (Wooldridge, 2010).
The results in Table 4 replicate the analysis in Table 3 for the subsample of
matched municipalities and all the results, in terms of both the size and the
statistical significance of the estimated coe cients, are fully confirmed.
18
Figure 1: Propensity score in Treated and control group, before and after imple-
menting the matching procedure
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Figure 1: Propensity score in Treated and control group, before and after implementing the matching procedure
Notes: the  figure  presents  the  distribution  of  the  estimated propensity score between treated and control municipalities, 
before and after the matching procedure. For the matching procedure  we use the “nearest neighbor” approach as explained 
in section 6.3.
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Table 4: Policy outcomes results on a sample of matched municipalities
As a second check we control whether the results are driven by the amount of
compensating transfers that municipalities received from the central government.
In fact, as we have described in section 2.1, in 2008 and subsequent years, each
municipality received a transfer whose amount was determined by some past in-
dicators. Therefore, it might be the case that some municipalities received an
amount of compensating transfer very similar to the missing revenue from the
property tax on owner-occupied dwellings, while, on the other hand, some munic-
ipalities received an amount of compensating transfer by far di↵erent (and lower)
than the missing revenue from the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings. The
di↵erence in the amount of transfers received by the municipality might drive our
results, so that the e↵ect of the reform is not due to the reform per se´, but, in-
stead, by the higher/lower amount of transfers that the municipality received
with respect to the revenue collected from the property tax on owner-occupied
dwellings. In order to check for this issue, we build a variable, icigrants, contain-
ing the per capita revenue of the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings from
2006 to 2007 and, the per capita value of the grant compensating municipalities
Table 4: Policy outcomes results on a sample of matched municipalities
current 
expenditure 
property tax on 
other dwellings 
surtax on personal 
income 
fees and 
charges 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
pre electoral year -0.00 14.06 1.01 -3.78 
(3.48) (16.43) (1.04) (3.11) 
pre electoral year × after Reform 21.91** -21.51 -1.55 19.82** 
(8.67) (21.37) (2.72) (8.08) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipal time trend YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
4,669 2,001 4,669 4,669 
667 667 667 667 
502 502 502 502 
165 165 165 165 
Observations 
Number of municipalities 
Treated municipalities 
Control municipalities 
R-squared within 0.65 0.62 0.49 0.56 
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable 
equals to one in the year before the election and after reform is a dummy variable equals to one after the reform (2008). The number of 
observations in col. (2) is 2,001 since the distinction between revenue from property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings and revenue 
from property tax levied on other dwellings has been recorded in Italian municipal budget only from 2006 onwards. In all regression we 
control for population, density, child, aged, transfers, income, election, municipal effects, municipal time trend and year effects. Robust 
standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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for the corresponding missing revenue on owner-occupied dwellings in 2008.
First, we look at the mean di↵erence of the variable icigrants, between control
and treated municipalities, before (2006 and 2007) and after the reform (2008).
The di↵erence in the variable icigrants (Table 5) for control municipalities before
and after the reform (-12.40 per capita euros) is smaller than the same di↵er-
ence for treated municipalities (-17.68 per capita euros), and such di↵erences are
statistically significant at 1%, implying that both group of municipalities have,
on average, received an amount of compensating transfers lower then the rev-
enue collected through the property tax on owner-occupied dwellings. However,
the di↵erence of the di↵erences in the variable icigrants between control and
treated municipalities, before and after the reform, leads to an estimate that is
not statistically significant, implying that the change in the financial resources of
treated municipalities, due to the switch from the property tax on owner-occupied
dwellings to the compensating transfer, for treated municipalities is, on average,
the same to that of the control municipalities.
Table 5: Mean di↵erence estimates of fiscal reform on the variable icigrants
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control for population, density, child, aged, transfers, income, election, municipal effects, municipal time trend and year effects. Robust
standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 5: Mean difference estimates of fiscal reform on the variable
icigrants
icigrants control group 
(1) 
treated group 
(2) 
Difference 
(Treated - Control) 
(3) 
Pre reform (2006-2007) 
53.53 64.85 11.32*** 
(3.97) 
After reform (2008 ) 
41.14 47.17 6.03*** 
(1.85) 
Difference (After -Pre) 
-12.40*** -17.68*** -5.28 
(2.15) (2.79) (3.52) 
Notes: Period 2006-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 
inhabitants. Number of observations 2.199. Number of treated municipalities: 506, 
number of control municipalities: 227. Column (1) reports average per capita revenue of 
the variable icigrants for control municipalities before and after the reform; column (2) 
displays average per capita revenue of the variable icigrants for treated municipalities 
before and after the reform; column (3) shows the average difference of per capita 
revenue of the variable icigrants for control and treated municipalities before and after 
the reform. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in 
parentheses. Significance at 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at 
the 1% level by ***.  
Table 6: Estimates of fiscal reform on the variable icigrants
Dependent variable: icigrants Whole sample Sample of matched municipalities
(1) (2)
pre electoral year 1.78 1.08
(8.76) (9.38)
pre electoral year × after Reform 5.85 7.71
(14.43) (15.13)
Municipality FE YES YES
Municipal time trend YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Observations 2,199 2,001
Number of municipalities 733 667
Treated municipalities 506 502
Control municipalities 227 165
R-squared within 0.57 0.57
Notes: Period 2006-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable
equals to one in the year before the election and after reform is a dummy variable equals to one after the reform (2008). Col. (1) reports the
results by using all the sample available, col. (2) displays the results by using the sample of matched municipalities. In all regression we
control for population, density, child, aged, transfers (net of compensating transfers for the year 2008), income, election, municipal effects, 
municipal time trend and year effects. Robust standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%;
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Second, we replicate the previous regressions of equation (1) by using, as the
dependent variable, the new variable icigrants.9 Were the coe cient of pre elec-
toral year ⇥after reform significant, it would mean that municipalities in the
pre-electoral year after reform would have received a greater /smaller (according
to the sign of the coe cient) amount of financial resources with respect to other
municipalities and, hence, it would be impossible to separate the e↵ect of the
reform, from the e↵ect of having more (or less) financial resources, in term of the
received compensating transfer. The results show that the variable pre electoral
year ⇥after reform is not statistically di↵erent from zero, both for the whole sam-
ple (col. 1, Table 6) and for the sample of matched municipalities (col. 2, Table
6). These results indicate that being in a pre-electoral year after the reform has
no significant e↵ect on the amount of money that municipalities received from the
central governments for replacing the missing revenue from the property tax on
owner-occupied dwellings. This strongly suggests that the increase in expenditure
and revenue from fees and charges observed for municipalities in the pre-electoral
year after the reform (Table 3) is not due to the amount of grants received by
municipalities for compensating the missing revenue from the property tax on
owner-occupied dwellings.
9Since the variable icigrants contains the per capita value of the grant compensating munic-
ipalities for the corresponding missing revenue on owner-occupied dwellings in 2008, the control
variable transfers, in this specification, is net of the compensating grants in the year 2008.
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Table 6: Estimates of fiscal reform on the variable icigrants
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control for population, density, child, aged, transfers, income, election, municipal effects, municipal time trend and year effects. Robust
standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 5: Mean difference estimates of fiscal reform on the variable
icigrants
icigrants control group
(1)
treated group
(2)
Difference
(Treated - Control)
(3)
Pre reform (2006-2007)
53.53 64.85 11.32***
(3.97)
After reform (2008 )
41.14 47.17 6.03*** 
(1.85)
Difference (After -Pre)
-12.40*** -17.68*** -5.28
(2.15) (2.79) (3.52)
Notes: Period 2006-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000
inhabitants. Number of observations 2.199. Number of treated municipalities: 506,
number of control municipalities: 227. Column (1) reports average per capita revenue of
the variable icigrants for control municipalities before and after the reform; column (2)
displays average per capita revenue of the variable icigrants for treated municipalities
before and after the reform; column (3) shows the average difference of per capita
revenue of the variable icigrants for control and treated municipalities before and after
the reform. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in
parentheses. Significance at 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***.
Table 6: Estimates of fiscal reform on the variable icigrants
 Dependent variable: icigrants Whole sample Sample of matched municipalities 
(1) (2) 
pre electoral year 1.78 1.08 
(8.76) (9.38) 
pre electoral year × after Reform 5.85 7.71 
(14.43) (15.13) 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Municipal time trend YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 2,199 2,001 
Number of municipalities 733 667 
Treated municipalities 506 502 
Control municipalities 227 165 
R-squared within 0.57 0.57 
Notes: Period 2006-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable 
equals to one in the year before the election and after reform is a dummy variable equals to one after the reform (2008). Col. (1) reports the 
results by using all the sample available, col. (2) displays the results by using the sample of matched municipalities. In all regression we 
control for population, density, child, aged, transfers (net of compensating transfers for the year 2008), income, election, municipal effects, 
municipal time trend and year effects. Robust standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Finally, the e↵ect of the reform on policy outcomes can be driven by mayors with
a binding term limit (the Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two
consecutive mandates for the o ce of mayor), since they might have di↵erent
incentives to use tax instruments with respect to mayors where the term limit
is not binding. To analyze this issue, and so investigate whether there has been
any heterogeneous response to the 2008 reform across municipalities with mayors
with a binding term limit, we build a termlim dummy variable, which is equal to
one if the mayor is at her second mandate and zero otherwise and interact it with
both pre electoral year and pre electoral year ⇥after reform in a triple-di↵erence
model.  Therefore  the  model  we  estimate  is  a  modified  version of the model (1)
taking the following form:
Yit =  1pre elecotral yearit +  2pre elecotral yearit ⇥ after reform
+  3pre electoral yearit ⇥ termlimit +  4pre elecotral yearit ⇥ after reform⇥ termlimit
+  termlimit ⇥ after reform+ ⇡termlimit +  0Xit + ↵i + ⌧t +  Trendit + ✏it (2)
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where termlim is a dummy variable equal to one if the mayor is at her second
mandate and zero otherwise. Our variables of interest are pre electoral year
⇥after reform and pre electoral year ⇥after reform ⇥termlim where the former
captures the impact for no-term limit municipalities in the pre electoral year after
the reform, and the latter captures how such impact changes for municipalities
whose mayor is lame-duck.
We find that the coe cient of pre electoral year ⇥after reform is positive and
statistically significant at 5% for expenditure (22.37 per capita euro; col. 1, Table
7) and, that of pre electoral year ⇥after reform ⇥termlim is not statistically
significant. Hence, municipalities that are in the pre-electoral year after the
reform increase their current expenditure (22.37 per capita euro), regardless of
the status of being a mayor with a binding term limit. The results remain the
same when we run regression on the matched sample of municipalities (col. 5,
Table 7).
As it regards revenues from fees and charges, we find that the coe cient of pre
electoral year ⇥after reform is positive and statistically significant at 1% (27.43
per capita euro; col. 4, Table 7) and, that of pre electoral year ⇥after reform
⇥termlim is negative (-30.02) and statistically significant at 5%. The impact of
being in a pre-electoral year after the reform for municipalities which are term
limit is 27.43 - 30.02 = -2.59, which is not statistically di↵erent from zero (p-value
= 0.826)10, implying, also in this case, that municipalities that are in the pre-
10In the case where we use all municipalities (col. 4, table 7), the linear combination of the
coe cients of pre electoral year ⇥after reform + pre electoral year ⇥after reform ⇥termlim
leads to an estimation equals to 27.43 - 30.02 = -2.59, which is not statistically di↵erent from
zero (p-value = 0.826), while in the case where we use the matched sample of municipalities
(col. 8, table 7), the linear combination of the coe cients of pre electoral year ⇥after reform+
pre electoral year ⇥after reform ⇥termlim leads to an estimation equals to 29.98 - 30.53 = -0.55, 
which is not statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.964).
electoral year after the reform increase revenue from fees and charges regardless
of the status of being a mayor with a binding term limit. Also in this case,
the results remain the same when we run regression on the matched sample of
municipalities (col. 8, Table 7).
As it concerns revenue from both property tax on other dwellings and surtax on
personal income we do not find any e↵ect due to the reform, either for munici-
palities with mayors with a binding term limit or for municipalities with mayors
with a no binding term limit (col. 2 and 3, Table 7).
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Table 7: Policy outcomes results and term-limit
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Table 7: Policy outcomes results and term limit
Whole sample Sample of matched municipalities 
current expenditure 
property tax on 
other dwellings 
surtax on personal 
income fees and charges current expenditure 
property tax on 
other dwellings 
surtax on 
personal income fees and charges 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pre electoral year  0.66 12.66 0.71 -2.15 0.44 8.15 0.82 -2.86 
(4.39) (13.54) (1.15) (4.05) (4.66) (18.39) (1.32) (4.64) 
pre electoral year × after reform 22.37** -14.27 0.95 27.43*** 26.96** -12.91 -2.08 29.98*** 
(10.24) (21.90) (2.83) (9.11) (12.03) (27.56) (3.36) (10.36) 
pre electoral year × termlim -1.94 8.20 0.55 -1.06 -0.58 19.54 0.38 -1.00 
(6.98) (25.13) (1.73) (7.34) (7.39) (32.04) (1.85) (7.95) 
pre electoral year ×  after reform ×  termlim  -10.74 -25.98 0.59 -30.02** -14.49 -29.85 1.67 -30.53* 
(15.17) (30.99) (4.59) (14.59) (17.44) (39.03) (5.33) (15.98) 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,131 2,199 5,131 5,131 4,669 2,001 4,669 4,669 
Number of municipalities 733 733 733 733 667 667 667 667 
Treated municipalities 506 506 506 506 502 502 502 502 
Control municipalities 227 227 227 227 165 165 165 165 
R-squared within 0.66 0.63 0.49 0.56 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.56
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Pre electoral year is a dummy variable equals to one in the year before the election; after reform is a dummy variable 
equals to one after the reform (2008) and termlim is a dummy variable equal to one if the mayor is at her second mandate and zero otherwise. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the results by using all the sample 
available; columns (5), (6), (7) and (8) display the results by using the sample of matched municipalities. The number of observations in col. (2) and col. (6) is lower because the distinction between revenue from 
property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings and revenue from property tax levied on other dwellings has been recorded in Italian municipal budget only from 2006 onwards. In all regression we control for 
termlim×after reform, termlim, population, density, child, aged, transfers, income, election, municipal effects, municipal time trend and year effects. Robust standard errors, cluster at the municipal level, are shown in 
parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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the local property tax on owner-occupied dwellings was abolished and the corre-
sponding tax yield was replaced for municipal budgets by a compensating transfer
from the central government, thus providing a good framework to test for strate-
gic manipulation of policy outcome decisions in anticipation of elections when
part of the financial system is switched from decentralized to centralized. We
found that the reform impacts on the political budget cycles, leading municipal-
ities that were in the pre-electoral year after the reform to expand the size of
their budget, by increasing current expenditure and fees and charges, compared
to municipalities that were in the pre-electoral year before the reform. In addi-
tion, the increase in the expenditure and revenues of municipalities that are in
the pre-electoral year after the reform does not depend on the status of being a
mayor with a binding term limit.
These results suggest that the centralization process of the tax system can gener-
ate stronger incentives for municipalities to manipulate policy outcome decisions
when close to elections, while, on the contrary, under a decentralized tax system,
such incentives are weaker.
In this study we investigated the impact on local policy outcome decisions of a
very  salient  fiscal  reform,  introduced  by  the  Italian  government.  Since  2008,
6 Conclusion
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
current expenditure 5131 632.07 219.17 218.55 2362.66 
surtax on personal income 5131 29.53 27.16 0.00 217.10 
fees and charges 5131 176.79 183.90 8.19 3408.61 
property tax on other dwellings 2199 149.73 115.01 0.00 2101.19 
icigrants 2199 56.00 60.47 0.00 1467.49 
after reform 5131 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
population 5131 4028.23 658.18 2269.00 7535.00 
child 5131 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.09 
old 5131 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.34 
density 5131 291.21 333.11 14.18 3304.00 
income 5131 11198.29 3296.32 2819.97 28118.87 
transfers 5131 193.11 122.08 5.42 1627.43 
termlim 5131 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
pre electoral year 5131 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Period 2002-2008. Years before the reform are 2002-2007. Year after the reform is 2008. Municipalities with population between 
3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. For the variable property tax on other dwellings data are available only from the 2006 since the distinction 
between revenue from property tax levied on owner-occupied dwellings and revenue from property tax levied on other dwellings has been 
recorded in Italian municipal budget only from 2006 onwards.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition and measure 
Available 
from-to Source 
current expenditure Current expenditure per resident; 2011 Euros 2002-2008 Italian Ministry of Interior 
surtax on national 
income Revenue from surtax on personal income per resident; 2011 Euros 2002-2008 Italian Ministry of Interior 
fees and charges Revenue from fees and charges per resident; 2011 Euros 2002-2008 Italian Ministry of Interior 
property tax on other 
dwellings Revenue from property tax on other dwellings per resident; 2011 Euros 2006-2008 Italian Ministry of Interior 
icigrants 
Vector containing revenue per resident of property taxes on owner-occupied dwellings from 2006 to 2007 and compensating 
grants per resident for the corresponding missing revenue on owner-occupied dwellings for 2008; 2011 Euros 2006-2008 Our computation 
pre electoral year Dummy variable equal to 1 in the year before the election 2002-2008 Our computation 
after reform Dummy variable equal to 1 for year 2008 2002-2008 Our computation 
population Population of the municipality 2002-2008 ISTAT 
child Share of the population aged between 0-5 2002-2008 ISTAT 
old Share of the population over the age of 65 2002-2008 ISTAT 
density Numbers of citizens per area 2002-2008 Our computation 
income Real personal income tax base per resident; 2011 Euros 2002-2008 
Italian Ministry of 
Economy, Department of 
Finance 
transfers Total current transfers from the upper level of the government (State and Regions) 2002-2008 Italian Ministry of Interior 
termlim Dummy variable equals to one if the mayor is at her second mandate and zero otherwise 2002-2008 Our computation 
election Dummy variable equal to 1 for each election year of the municipalities and zero otherwise 2002-2008 
Italian Ministry of Interior, 
Department of Internal 
Affairs 
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Table A3: Logit Regression 
Treated 
(1) 
altitude 0.00 
(0.00) 
population -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
aged -3.10 
(3.50) 
child -6.92 
(13.71) 
density -8.66 
(11.61) 
income 0.00 
(0.00) 
transfers 0.00 
(0.00) 
families 6.93* 
(4.10) 
houses -0.82 
(0.61) 
firms 6.68 
(6.68) 
unemployed -4.49** 
(1.75) 
altimetry zone -0.12 
(0.12) 
Constant 0.95 
(1.97) 
Observations 733 
Notes: Period 2001. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. All the variables, a part from income and 
transfers, are from the 2001 Census. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%. 
31
Table A4: Difference between the matched set of treated and control municipalities on the characteristics used for the 
matching procedure.  
Mean Difference (T-test) 
Variable Treated Control t p>|t| 
population 3,850.500 3,856.600 -0.160 0.870 
altimetry zone 1.663 1.673 -0.180 0.861 
aged 0.191 0.194 -1.160 0.244 
child 0.055 0.054 1.000 0.320 
density 0.008 0.007 0.960 0.340 
income 11,341.000 11,505.000 -0.720 0.470 
transfers 265.430 252.790 1.460 0.146 
families 0.384 0.384 -0.040 0.971 
houses 0.487 0.484 0.240 0.808 
firms 0.064 0.064 0.600 0.547 
unemployed 0.067 0.065 0.380 0.702 
altitude 263.520 261.940 0.120 0.903 
Notes: Period 2001. Municipalities with population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. All the 
variables, a part from income and transfers, are from the 2001 Census.
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